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a b s t r a c t
In this case study, a collaborative risk method for information security management has been analyzed
considering the common problems encountered during the implementation of ISO standards in eight
Turkish public organizations. This proposed risk method has been applied within different public orga-
nizations and it has been demonstrated to be effective and problem-free. The fundamental issue is that
there is no legislation that regulates the information security liabilities of the public organizations in
Turkey. The findings and lessons learned presented in this case provide useful insights for practition-
ers when implementing information security management projects in other international public sector
organizations.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Public organizations in Turkey have been showing an increasing
interest in information security standards since 2005 with ISO/IEC
27001:2005 and ISO/IEC 27002:2005 as the two most widely avail-
able and adopted. ISO 27001 provides a model for setting up and
managing an effective Information Security Management System
(ISMS). It specifies the requirements for establishing, implement-
ing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving
a documented ISMS within the context of the organization’s overall
business risks. Thus, the most crucial step to fulfill these require-
ments is to perform a risk analysis with respect to business risks. ISO
27001 does not recommend a specific risk analysis method; rather
it just states it to be a mandatory process by the requirement to
“define a systematic approach to risk assessment”.
Previous research emphasize that information security is not
only a technical matter as Solms notes “Not realizing that the pro-
tection of information is a business issue and not a technical issue”
(Solms & Solms, 2004). Therefore, to achieve information security,
organization culture must be changed and executives must take
part in processes related with information security. ISO 27001 has
been developed considering these issues, where it is not a technical
standard but rather a business standard that helps establishing an
infrastructure for improving information security continuously in
an organization.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: sozkan@ii.metu.edu.tr (S. Ozkan).
According to Solms (2001), information security is a multi-
dimensional discipline incorporating corporate governance. The
information possessed by organizations is among its most valu-
able assets and is critical to its success. The top level management,
which is ultimately accountable for the organization’s success, is
therefore responsible for the protection of its information (Solms,
2001).
The important aspect of information security governance, which
is crucial for enterprise wide effectiveness of information security,
is the responsibility of top level management. Information security
governance must be an integral and transparent part of corporate
governance and should be aligned with the corporate governance
framework.
Legal dimension, without which information security gover-
nance cannot be achieved properly, is another important dimension
(Solms & Solms, 2004; Solms, 2001). In developed countries,
required legislation for information security that affects the public
organizations has already been enacted. However, Turkey does not
have a legislation that obligates the public organizations to obey
information security principles. Due to the lack of legislation, the
interests to ISO 27000 series standards are not enterprise wide;
rather they originate – as a result of the need to operate more
securely – from the Information Processing Departments (hereafter
IPDs) of public organizations.
Efforts of the IPDs on their own to establish enterprise-wide
information security management are not sufficient. In this study,
a collaborative information security risk management method is
proposed for IPDs of public organizations. This method has been
developed based on the findings from eight ISO/IEC 27001:2005
based information security management projects. These eight cases
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reveal a common outcome: the lack of the information security leg-
islation in Turkey affected the projects negatively. It is believed that
the proposed risk management method would be useful for public
organizations in other countries where, similar to Turkey, effective
information security management legislation is not enacted. The
proposed method is applied to a case in Turkey.
2. Information security management projects within
public organizations in Turkey
In Turkey, there is no legislation that regulates the informa-
tion security liabilities of public organizations. As stated in the
OECD e-government studies report, a comprehensive regulatory
approach to electronic data and transactions is needed in Turkey
(OECD Report Turkey, 2007). Turkey’s public sector has a tradi-
tion of passing legislation rather than using secondary regulations
to interpret basic legislation. The legislative approach to ensur-
ing proper functioning, equity and fairness in the public sector is
slower and more difficult to change – and thereby less respon-
sive – than using a framework of secondary regulations to guide
e-government implementation in a context of technological and
process change. According to the OECD survey, 75 percent of the
respondents that are the workers of central government think
that Turkey has regulatory challenges for e-government (OECD
Report Turkey, 2007). Respondents believe that legislation pre-
vents collaboration, it is complex and burdensome and it lacks of
recognition of e-government processes. Consequently, information
security governance principles cannot be fully applied within the
public agencies where top level management does not have any
formal, regulatory and explicit roles and responsibilities for infor-
mation security. Generally, top level managers do not obey due care
principles of information security (Solms & Solms, 2004).
One of the most important negative impacts of lack of legis-
lations is that there is no formal human resource infrastructure
for information security management in most of the public orga-
nizations in Turkey. In some of the public organizations, IPDs
of have been the only initiatives of enterprise-wide information
security implementation. Since IPDs do not have this role by
legislation, approximately five percent of Turkish public organiza-
tions understand the need for, and therefore accept to implement
enterprise-wide information security. Consequently, the scope and
affect of these implementation efforts of IPDs reveal many prob-
lems.
The authors of the paper have been conducting information
security management projects for public organizations in Turkey
since 2005. In this paper, eight projects are investigated together
with the discussion of problems that were encountered during
the project implementation process. IPDs of these eight organi-
zations (names have been kept anonymous due to confidentiality
agreements) initiated enterprise-wide information security imple-
mentations under the guidance of ISO 27001. These eight cases have
common problems and they all failed to perform an enterprise-
wide information security implementation.
In all of the organizations, the project owners were IPDs. This
means project requests originated within these departments and
the projects were conducted by IPD staff. In four of these projects,
the scope was the whole organization and in the rest four, the scope
was the IPDs only. The top level managers of the four public organi-
zations were aware of the project, whereas top management of the
other four organizations was not even informed about the project.
Four of these public organizations were financial institutions and
the remaining four are active in the following domains: justice,
ministry, regulatory body, auditing.
The projects have been conducted following the eight common
implementation steps of ISMSs. ISO 27001 adopts the “Plan-Do-
Check-Act” (PDCA) model, which is applied to structure and to
ensure continual improvement of all ISMS processes. “Plan” of
PDCA model comprises first five steps: (1) Determination of scope,
(2) The determination and valuation of assets within the scope,
(3) The determination of vulnerabilities of assets, (4) The deter-
mination and valuation of threats that exploits vulnerabilities,
(5) The determination and prioritization of risk. The remaining
three are as follows: “Do” corresponds to step (6) The determination
and application of countermeasures; “Check” corresponds to step
(7) Checking the effectiveness of countermeasures and performing
internal audit; and “Act” corresponds to step (8) The determination
and application of corrective and preventive actions.
The authors of this paper have given consultancy on each step of
the project and the employees of the organizations were the main
executers of the projects. In all of these organizations, core busi-
ness processes are implemented by IT systems with more than one
database and application servers. For most of the critical applica-
tions, servers are accessible via the Internet. All of the organizations
have standard security products like firewall and antivirus soft-
ware.
3. Problems encountered
IPD was the project owner in all of the organizations, which
was a problem especially for the projects having a scope of the
whole organization. This additionally caused a number of potency
problems during the projects. One problem was that in all of the
organizations, IPDs did not have sufficient and needed power to
implement most of the security countermeasures. Another prob-
lem was, because core business processes are implemented by IT
systems, a clear distinction between the IPD and the other business
departments could not be achieved. Thus, similar potency problems
occurred in the organizations.
Even for the organizations in which top level managers were
aware of the projects, management support and involvement could
not be achieved both for the project itself and for the procurement
and application of the countermeasures. It has been identified that
top level management and even the owner of the projects, i.e. IPDs,
had the misunderstandings such as:
1. Information security management is a technical concept and
totally related with IT.
2. Information security management should be confined with IPDs
only.
3. The head of the IPD should be responsible for enterprise-wide
information security.
4. Information security management can and should be achieved
by the consulting firm.
In all of the eight cases, the information security management
process could not be implemented effectively mainly due to the
lack of support and involvement of top level management. In all
eight cases, there was no formally appointed staff for the projects.
Informal participation of staff was not sufficient due to low staff-
hours (i.e. approximately 6 person-hours) per week allowed. The
percentages of countermeasures that are applied during the project
are quite low (5% or lower in three organizations and between 10%
and 50% in the other five) because only the ones that had no or
minimal cost to organization and that did not impact the whole
organization could be applied.
Apart from these fundamental problems, a number of secondary
problems were confronted in projects. During the determination
and valuation of assets, authors realized that only tangible assets
like hardware and software are listed in almost all of these eight
projects. For the “information” security projects, the most crucial
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assets are “information” assets, which are intangible. Without tak-
ing “information” into consideration, the asset inventory cannot be
established reliably and the values of assets cannot be determined
correctly. The vulnerabilities in assets, the threats that exploit these
vulnerabilities are determined by using asset inventory. Thus, a
tangible asset inventory would cause an incomplete risk analy-
sis focusing only on technical dimensions of information security
disregarding the social and non-technical dimensions.
In fact, the above-mentioned problems were consequences of a
more fundamental issue in all eight cases: all of the organizations
had their IT processes undocumented. Furthermore, both the tech-
nical staff and the managers of IPDs were not neither aware nor
knowledgeable about the intersection of business processes and IT
processes.
Due to these problems, in none of the eight projects, all imple-
mentation steps were accomplished. Only the first five steps, which
belong to the “planning” phase of PDCA cycle, were implemented.
At the sixth step, some of the countermeasures identified would
have some cost and top level management did not allow spending
for these countermeasures. For example, most of the organizations
have weak password policies. Implementing strong password pol-
icy is an easy configuration from the perspective of IPD. However,
the effects of this change would require some extra effort by com-
puter users including top level managers. These changes could not
be made due to the pressure from other departments and managers
of the organization. Since most of the crucial countermeasures
could not be implemented in step 6, the projects discontinued at
this step leaving steps 7 and 8. The initial aims of the projects
were not achieved and an information security management sys-
tem (ISMS) could not be established in any of the cases.
Information security management projects within eight public
organizations in Turkey have proved that, standards like ISO/IEC
27001:2005 does not ensure the establishment of an ISMS by itself.
In order to have an effective ISMS that covers the whole organi-
zation, information security governance principles should be in
place in the organization. ISO 27001 comprises what to do about
the constitution of information security management and assumes
that information security governance exists in the organization.
Therefore, existence of information security governance, whose
principles can be applied by enacting required legislation, is a pre-
requisite of ISO 27001.
It is important to mention that there are some positive issues:
these eight institutions were the first eight public organizations
that requested to establish ISMS, pioneering the realization of infor-
mation security governance in public institutions in Turkey.
4. Risk analysis methods for information security
Risk analysis, which is defined as the systematic use of informa-
tion to identify sources and to estimate the risk, is a preliminary
to risk management. If risk analysis is not performed properly,
the selection of countermeasures will fail, and risk management
process cannot be successful. Generally, risk analysis is a rather
complicated process because the risks are based on probability.
The complexity of the risk analysis process has become much more
pronounced when information and communication technologies
became widely used. In terms of information technologies, risk is
not a simple probabilistic value. It is the probability of a threat suc-
cessfully attacking an asset via a particular vulnerability. Thus, risk
depends on three inputs, asset, vulnerability and threat.
Risk = f (asset, vulnerability, threat) (1)
Function f given in the formula (1) shows an abstract risk model,
it has three inputs and one output; risk. There are some other
reasons for the particular complexity of information security risk
analysis. First of all, information is one of the most fundamen-
tal and important assets for companies. Thus, peculiar attention
should be given to information assets while performing risk anal-
ysis. However, information is an abstract asset. Information can
exist in many forms, electronic, hard copy, verbal etc. Infor-
mation does not have the capability of protecting itself against
malicious actions. Apart from information, hardware, software,
storage media, humans and hardcopy documents are assets as
well. Another reason for the difficulty of information security risk
analysis is the correlations between these asset categories. Vul-
nerability in an asset may turn into a threat for the other assets.
As an example, a computer virus may use the vulnerability of
outdated computer virus database. However, information, soft-
ware, humans and company reputation may suffer from computer
viruses. Reputation is just another abstract asset like information.
Its value cannot be measured in monetary terms. Risk analysis
methods for information security would need to answer all of these
challenges.
There are two types of risk analysis methods; quantitative risk
analysis methods contain mathematical instruments to evaluate
risk, qualitative risk analysis methods do not contain any mathe-
matical instruments. Some of the quantitative tools, which can be
used in a risk analysis process, use complex mathematical tools like
Bayesian networks, fuzzy logic, simulation and fault trees; which
are advanced and comprehensive to model specific risk situations
in depth. Generally, these tools require tremendous mathematical
calculation to be fit into the information security area that spans
wide risk scenarios. There are a number of quantitative methods
proposed for the information security risk analysis process in the
academic studies which usually detail into specific problem areas
and try to solve problems by suggesting specific and effective solu-
tions for the specified problem area. However, public organizations
require simpler, more generic and collaborative methods (Tong,
Fung, Huang and Chan, 2003).
The foremost requirement to ensure information security man-
agement in public organizations is staff involvement. It cannot be
assured by a third party company or a consulting firm; rather it is a
continual process. Information security plan must be based on the
identified risks (Solms & Solms, 2004). The risks and their levels are
determined within the risk analysis process. Thus, qualitative tools
or quantitative tools that do not have complicated mathematical
instruments would be best suitable for public organizations. Fur-
ther, risk analysis methods for information security management
should have the capability of determining the processes within the
scope, the assets within the processes, the vulnerabilities of the
assets, the threats and finally the risk. The methods that have heavy
quantitative tools may fail during the modeling process.
5. Proposed information security risk management method
The actual remedy for the aforementioned problems is to have
information security legislation that urges the top level man-
agement to take responsibility on information security issues. In
Turkey, the IPDs of public organizations show interest in informa-
tion security management and specifically in information security
risk analysis projects. However, in the short term, the informa-
tion security legislation is not expected to be enacted in Turkey.
Therefore, an effective and problem-free risk management method
is necessary for public organizations willing to implement infor-
mation security management projects.
“Information security is not a technical issue, rather it is a
social/business/regulatory issue” (Solms & Solms, 2004; Solms,
2001). However, in practice, as evident from the eight cases investi-
gated, information security is perceived as solely technical concept
confined within the IPDs. The authors have come across a num-
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ber of vulnerabilities at IT services in these cases. Although all
of the eight organizations have standard firewall and antivirus
products in place, the security policies of firewall were not strict
and virus databases were out-of-date. This is one of the many
outcomes of not having an enterprise-wide ISMS which ensures
continuous improvement of security processes. However with-
out clearly defined roles and responsibilities including top level
management’s, establishing and maintaining an enterprise-wide
information security management system is almost impossible
without legislations and corporate governance as it has been
observed during the eight projects. In that regard, the proposed
method aims to establish an information security management sys-
tem within IPDs of public organizations, not targeting the whole
organization.
The problems that are directly related with the lack of informa-
tion security governance principles can be solved by the enactment
of information security legislation. As a workaround solution to
these problems, the scope of the information security management
project should be “the activities of the IPD”; for example, manag-
ing user accounts in LDAP server, configuring routers and switches,
managing databases, etc. These activities are directly related with
the IPD and do not have strong relation with the core business pro-
cesses. By doing so, the IPD can conduct a risk analysis process,
take countermeasures and finally establish an information security
management system by itself. At the beginning of the project, the
scope should be determined carefully so that IPD can implement
PDCA cycle by itself.
Another problem observed is related with the features and ease
of use of the risk analysis method within risk management. This
can be solved by modeling the activities of information processing
department, in other words by enabling process modeling within
the scope. Risk analysis method for ISO 27001 based informa-
tion security management projects should have the capability of
determining the processes within the scope, the assets within the
processes, the vulnerabilities of the assets, the threats and finally
the risk by using simple qualitative tools. A method which has these
properties will also contribute positively to the participation of the
staff. In the light of these findings, in the proposed method, the first
of eight ISMS implementation steps has been replaced by two steps:
(1) The scope: the activities of IPD and (2) The determination and
modeling of the processes. This helps IPD to take countermeasures
easily and run PDCA cycle by itself.
6. Case analysis
The organization’s information technology infrastructure com-
prises the following. Employees use thin clients/computers. All of
the applications and files are hosted at terminal servers. Database
servers, e-mail servers and domain controllers use disk arrays. The
data at disk arrays are backed up by backup server. There is one
firewall, one intrusion detection system and one antivirus server
for the security needs. There is one web server at the DMZ section.
Web server is accessed from the Internet. This information system
is operated by five system administrators. One for database server,
one for disk array and backup server, one for domain controllers,
web servers, one for network devices and security services and one
for terminal servers and thin clients. Information security was not
considered systematically in the design of this system like the PACS
(Tong, Fung, Huang and Chan, 2003).
The implementation of the proposed risk analysis method lasted
about four weeks from scratch. Initially, a risk analysis team com-
prising five system administrators was formed. The team members
were trained before starting the project so that they worked with-
out any ambiguity during the entire process. They were involved
with the determination and valuation of the assets, vulnerabilities,
threats; and with the risk assessment process and countermeasure
selection.
Scope is the area in which the risks are identified. The determi-
nation of scope is a requirement of ISO/IEC 27001:2005. The scope
defines the activities, functions and services to be provided to inter-
nal and/or external customers. Thus, scope draws the frame of the
risk analysis. In our case study, the scope is selected as “the activities
of the IPD” as stated in the proposed method.
In the second step, processes are determined and modeled. Any
activity using resources and managed in order to enable the trans-
formation of inputs into outputs can be considered to be a process.
The design and implementation of an organization’s ISMS is influ-
enced by the processes within the organization. A process can be
seen as a value chain by contributing to the creation or delivery
of a product or service. Seven processes are determined within
the scope: (1) Network, (2) Substructure, (3) Security, (4) Terminal,
(5) Storage, (6) Backup, and (7) Database. Network process includes
operation and maintenance of switches, routers, communication
cables. Substructure process composed of active directory, DNS,
DHCP, WINS and web server. Security process composed of fire-
wall, intrusion detection system and antivirus. Terminal process
includes terminal servers and thin clients. Storage process com-
posed of disk arrays. Backup process composed of backup software
and hardware. Finally, database process includes database servers
and corresponding client side applications.
Fig. 1 depicts details of the database process only. The remaining
six processes were modeled using a similar approach.
Database process is modeled by using flowchart techniques. The
basic flowchart (Level 1) depicts the following activities visually:
computer user enters data to database server by using web appli-
cation. While performing this operation, he uses his computer/thin
client. The data goes through the transmission lines. Data goes
through the application server before written onto the database.
Level 1 is composed of seven assets within the process. Thus, assets
are determined while modeling the process. The flowchart at Level
1 shows what information processing elements are used within
the database process. The processes of IPDs can be easily modeled
as in Fig. 1 by using flow chat techniques since IT processes are
not as complicated as core business processes. Because the method
is collaborative, a complicated process modeling technique is not
preferred. Flow charting is a well-known and widely used model-
ing technique. The advantages of flowcharts center on their ability
to show the overall structure of a system; to trace the flow of infor-
mation and work; to depict the physical media on which data are
entered, produced, and stored; and to highlight key processing and
decision points (Giaglis, 2001). These are important features for
information security management.
In the proposed method, two independent asset valuation cri-
teria are used. The first one captures qualitative information and
determines the impact of the abuse of the asset on confidentiality,
integrity and availability scaled in four levels from “low” to “very
high”. The other criterion depicts quantitative information and it is
the total monetary loss if the asset is abused where each of these
four levels corresponds to monetary values. The value of an asset
is the “total” monetary cost if it is abused. For instance, when the
backbone switch is damaged, both the cost of the switch and the
cost of unavailable business activities during interruption should
be considered. The value of an asset is totally independent from
the confidentiality, integrity and availability values. One asset may
affect the confidentiality and integrity significantly, but its value
may be low.
These monetary values have been determined by the represen-
tatives of the organization and are dynamic in content as they can
be altered according to the budget of the organization. Also, the
security requirements of the organizations may vary. All of the
results of asset determination and asset valuation processes have
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Fig. 1. Assets, vulnerabilities and threats for the database process.
been entered in spreadsheets and an asset classification report is
produced.
After determining and valuation of assets, the vulnerabilities of
assets within each process and the threats that exploit the vulnera-
bilities are determined. This is shown as Level 2 in Fig. 1. By taking
the values of assets, the criticality of vulnerabilities, the strengths
of already used countermeasures and the nature of threats into
consideration, the likelihoods and impact levels of threats are
determined. Depending on the likelihood (e.g. “low” if ‘less than
once per year’, “very high” if ‘greater than once per day’) and the
impact (e.g. “very high” if ‘damage caused may not be compen-
sated and it is organization wide’; “low” if ‘damage caused may
be compensated in the short term and the threat prevalence is the
department’) of the threat, risk values are determined. This part of
the method corresponds to the Level 3 of Fig. 1. The risk method
for determining the risk level is shown in Formula 2, which is a
well-known and widely used risk basic model. “Likelihood of threat”
and “the impact level of threat” parameters are shown explicitly in
Formula 2. The other parameters “asset value” and “vulnerability
level” are implicit parameters. These parameters change the levels
of explicit parameters shown in the Formula 2, hence they change
the risk value as well. The values of risk are dynamic and may be
altered in order to reflect the specific security requirements of the
specific organization.
Risk = likelihood of threat ∗ the impact level of threat (2)
The risk values that are determined together with the representa-
tives of the organization are raw values and are unrefined, which
cannot be interpreted in their current form. These risk values need
to be prioritized according to the predefined criteria of organi-
zation. The criteria to be considered for risk prioritization process
were the security requirements of organization, the cost of coun-
termeasures, the budget of organization and the usability and the
operability of the countermeasure – these were determined collab-
oratively with the involvement of employees of the organization.
There are two fundamental explicit inputs for determining priority:
the cost and the importance of the countermeasure. The importance
is determined by taking the risk analysis result and the secu-
rity requirements into account. The cost includes the price of the
planned countermeasure, and the operation and setup costs. The
budget of the organization also contributes to this value. Priority
level is determined by assessing these parameters. For example, if
the cost is “low” and the importance of the risk is “very high” than its
priority is assigned as “very high” and vice versa. Risk prioritization
– done in line with the organization’s needs – stands between risk
analysis and determination of countermeasures. After risks are pri-
oritized, countermeasures were determined collaboratively with
the involvement of the organization staff.
Upon the completion of the risk analysis and prioritization pro-
cesses, a total of 115 risks have been identified in all of the seven
processes within the scope of this case study. Three percent of
these risks are very high. The majority of the risks are high (35%),
medium (27%) and low (35%) level risks. The risks with very high
values are: “the existence of shared administrator accounts”, “the
lack of password policy within the active directory system” and
“the existence of a server behind the firewall instead of the DMZ,
which is accessed from the Internet”. Countermeasures for two
of these can be implemented by the IPD. “The lack of password
policy” is not implemented because the affects of corresponding
countermeasure spans the whole company. Countermeasures are
implemented for most of the risks within processes – i.e. ranging
from 60 to 100% for each process. In total, for all seven processes,
82% of the determinate countermeasures are applied. The remain-
ing 18% of countermeasures are not implemented due to high costs
or countermeasure’s wide range of effect. When compared with the
common eight-step ISMS implementation method where at most
50% of the countermeasures were implemented, the proposed risk
assessment method proves itself as more effective.
Countermeasures selection is one of the most crucial steps of the
ISMS establishment process, because countermeasures help either
to decrease the risk level or to eliminate the risk. Security counter-
measures may be established for formulating an effective overall
security solution to address threats at all layers of the informa-
tion infrastructure (Kim & Lee, 2005). Kim and Lee (2005) propose
a method for the selection of countermeasures. In their method,
information value, threat level, security services, the scope of secu-
rity services are considered for selection of both technical and
non-technical countermeasures. In our case study, the same factors
were taken into consideration for the selection of countermeasures.
Additionally, ISO 27002 was an important resource utilised. This
standard has 133 high level countermeasures that cover both inter-
nal and external threats. Yeh and Chang (2007) also emphasize the
importance of this standard. Except for externally requested regula-
tions, such as privacy laws or government regulations, firms mostly
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determine their security policies and procedures internally (Yeh &
Chang, 2007). The selection process took as much time as the other
steps of case study, during which both the staff of the organization
and the consultants as external factors were involved.
As final remarks of the case study, ISO 27004 has been referred to
for validation of the effectiveness of countermeasures. After setup
and application of countermeasures, an internal audit is performed
by a team whose members were not involved in the implementa-
tion project. After completion of the internal audit, corrective and
preventive actions have been determined and taken.
7. Discussion and conclusion
The case study implementation has demonstrated that, the
proposed risk analysis method is in line with the nature of infor-
mation security risk analysis. It brings a systematic and structured
approach to risk analysis. More importantly, it is collaborative
allowing effective involvement, i.e. discussions, decisions, etc. of
the employees in the information security risk analysis process.
As discussed previously, complicated mathematical and statistical
tools would have limited use in modeling the risks of information
security in public organizations.
Unlike most of the information management projects where
asset inventory is performed right after the determination of the
scope; the proposed method suggests determining and modeling
processes before creation of asset inventory. Because processes
are composed of assets, having well-defined processes beforehand
enables determining assets easily and completely, capturing all tan-
gible, i.e. hardware/software, and intangible, i.e. information assets.
The proposed method provides a “suggested scope”. The expe-
riences from the eight public cases show that requests arise from
the IPDs and that scope has to be determined carefully. Thus, “the
activities of IPD” is a well-refined scope in order to establish a PDCA
cycle within the IPD.
The official ISO/IEC 27001:2005 route can be very difficult
because of its “all-or-nothing” design and an incremental approach
to certification is suggested (Solms & Solms, 2001). It is believed
that it would be possible to cover all of the sections of ISO/IEC
27002:2005 with the proposed method within the scope of “the
activities of the IPD”.
Our collaborative process-based risk analysis reveals crucial IT
processes within its scope and analyzes the risks associated with
these processes. Traditionally, a great deal of attention is focused on
efforts that address the risks affecting business information from
an IT infrastructure point of view (Posthumus & Solms, 2004). The
proposed method does not put an emphasis on technical items such
as servers and software, rather, it accents IT processes.
It is believed that the proposed risk management method would
be useful for public organizations in countries where effective infor-
mation security management legislation has not yet been enacted
like Turkey. This method may be beneficial for the adaptation of
the IPDs to new governance principles after possible enactment of
legislation in the near future.
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